A Decision Model for Executing Plant Strategy: Maintaining the Technical Integrity of Petroleum Flowlines by Ratnayake, R..M. Chandima
Ratnayake, R.M. Chandima (2012)
A Decision Model for Executing Plant Strategy: Maintaining the 
Technical Integrity of Petroleum Flowlines. International Journal of
Decision Sciences, Risk and Management, 4(1/2), pp. 1-24
Link to official URL: doi: 10.1504/IJDSRM.2012.046602 
(Access to content may be restricted)
UiS Brage
http://brage.bibsys.no/uis/
This version is made available in accordance with publisher policies. It is the 
authors’ last version of the article after peer review, usually referred to as postprint.
Please cite only the published version using the reference above.
A decision model for executing plant strategy: 
maintaining the technical integrity of petroleum 
flowlines 
R.M. Chandima Ratnayake 
Abstract: The ‘strategic’ management of technical integrity has become a high 
profile subject matter over recent years within inspection and maintenance of 
assets in the process industry. The assets such as production and process 
facilities require being optimised, prioritised and cost-effective inspection and 
maintenance, depending on whether they are at the beginning or end of their 
design life. In both cases, it is vital to ensure that sufficient condition 
monitoring data from all relevant sources are collated and analysed as a part in 
a planned scheme of inspection and maintenance. This is largely driven by 
certifying authority requirements, sound mechanical and corrosion engineering 
principles as well as inspection and maintenance approaches, indicated in a 
plant strategy. This manuscript suggests a model to execute plant strategy using 
analytic hierarchy process method. The model indicates the incorporation of 
requirements specified in a plant strategy for reaching optimised, prioritised 
and cost-effective outcome. 
Keywords: strategy execution; technical integrity; analytic hierarchy process; 
AHP; decision model. 
1 Introduction 
In general, industrial organisations manage strategy in fits and starts. Basically, 
executives and managers formulate an excellent strategy fitting to the purpose of the industrial 
organisation. However, the strategy can easily fade from memory as the organisation tackles 
day-to-day operations issues, a practice also known as ‘fighting fires’ (Lagace, 2008; Kaplan and 
Norton, 2000a). However, linking the organisational strategy to operational activities creates a 
competitive advantage resulting in organisational principles being woven into a more 
effective management system. Consequently, it represents the differences between strategy and 
operations while integrating them in a powerful and holistic way. 
The quote by Sun Tzu in The Art of War: “Strategy without tactics is the long road to victory; 
tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat” communicates the importance of integrating 
strategy and operations (Tzu, 2008). This is the central theme in a strategy execution system. 
However, without a strong visionary leadership recognising the importance of strategy and 
related tactics, no strategy can be executed effectively. 
In most situations, responsible personnel in industrial organisations tend to focus on day-to-
day operations and short-term problem solving. During their management meetings, they 
focus on ‘fighting fires’ and fixing problems by just allocating a little time and committing few 
resources to strategic issues. For instance, the KP3 report reveals that within the North Sea oil 
and gas (O&G) related operations, the influence of the engineering function has declined to a 
worrying level and the technical authorities are under pressure, often reacting to immediate 
operational problems rather than taking a strategic role to provide expertise and judgment on 
key operational engineering issues (KP3, 2009). Table 1 summarises the challenges, currently 
used approach/es/pitfalls, consequence/s, and suggested solutions for linking strategy with 
industrial operations. 
The balanced scorecard (BSC) offers an opportunity to report and discuss all 
strategically relevant measures, along with performance-improving initiatives. “It 
intensifies the focus on the strategy and identifies the management and organisational actions 
required to get performance back on track” (Kaplan and Norton, 2000a). Moreover, the 
BSC identifies five principles for strategy management in the book Strategy-Focused 
Organization: ‘mobilise, translate, align, motivate, and govern’ (Kaplan and Norton, 2000b). 
In the book The Execution Premium, the above principles are discussed in depth (Kaplan 
and Norton, 2008). Moreover, the book Strategy Maps, which focused on the second principle – 
translate, described and illustrated how strategy maps and scorecards could be customised to 
many different strategies (Kaplan and Norton, 2004). The third principle – align, i.e., how to 
create and capture corporate synergies through vertical and horizontal alignment of business and 
support units, is discussed in the book Alignment (see Kaplan and Norton, 2006; Ratnayake and 
Markeset, 2010a). The same book also contained material on the fourth principle – motivate 
(and align) employees for strategy execution in their business or support units. Double-loop 
management: Making strategy a continuous process provides a discussion about the fifth 
principle – govern, to make strategy a continual process (Kaplan and Norton, 2000a). However, 
the first challenge in strategy execution is to be sure that all of the ‘sub goals’ and ‘departmental 
action plans’ are themselves aligned with the larger strategy (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010a). 
Kaplan and Norton (2004) discuss this challenge in the strategy mapping process. In that process, a 
hierarchical list of strategy drivers is mapped onto the company strategy. At that point, it is 
relatively straightforward to develop targets and action plans for each driver. The mapping 
process, however, is not as formalised as the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology 
(Saaty, 1980, 1990). Also, neither strategy maps nor BSC have paid sufficient attention to 
integrating enterprise risk management (ERM) as well as how to evaluate the priorities in relation 
to the organisational strategy. 
Table 1 Challenges of linking the strategy with industrial operations 
Challenge 
Currently used 
approach/es/ 
pitfalls 
Consequence/s Suggested solution
1 Align the 
operational 
improvement 
activities to 
strategic 
priorities. 
• Total quality
management,
Six Sigma, or
other
continuous
improvement
activities.
• Done across the 
organisation with no 
sense of priorities or 
impact from process 
improvements.
• Much effort wasted 
without showing 
tangible results.
• Quality and 
improvement activities 
are like teaching 
people how to swim 
without a swimming 
pool.
• Implement a formal process 
for using strategic 
objectives to set priorities 
for where operational 
improvements can have the 
largest impact on strategy 
execution.
2 Budgeting and 
financial 
planning. 
• Done
separately
from strategic
planning.
• Operational plans 
either provide too 
little or too much 
capacity for the 
strategic plan.
• Drive the operational plan 
and budget from the 
revenue targets in the 
strategic plan.
• Use a time-driven activity-
based cost model that 
provides the previously 
missing link between the 
revenue growth targets in a 
strategic plan.
3 Management 
meetings. 
• Discussions
about
short-term
operational
and tactical
issues.
• Industrial originations 
err when they devote all 
their time together for 
fire-fighting and coping 
with
near-term issues.
• Meet to discuss and solve 
operational problems.
• Schedule strategy review 
meetings at a different time 
from operational review 
meetings focusing on 
frequency, agenda, 
information system, and 
participation, satisfying the 
goals of the meeting.
On the contrary, the strategy execution process is carried out by human beings who tend to 
work on an exception basis. They do not, and often cannot, deal with the entire strategy at 
once. The vastness of most strategy execution problems is generally beyond a human being’s 
mental capacity (Kennedy, 1998; Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010a; Saaty, 1980). Thus, it is 
desirable for the strategy execution process to deal with most of the strategy execution related 
challenge modelling and to involve the human being at critical points where needed. It is 
desirable to provide a strategy execution application that not only models intelligently, but 
also cooperates intelligently and coordinates the efforts with human strategy executors. At 
present, all the information about the strategy execution process, including what is truly 
feasible, and the information about the plan goals, the real definition of optimal, are rarely or 
not at all fully modelled in a measurable way within the strategy execution approaches. 
This paper suggests a formal model and a framework to execute plant strategy in order 
to optimise the number of inspections that should be carried out visually. The model is 
derived using a multi-criteria decision-making approach: the AHP. The model is developed 
based on literature, industrial practices, and experiences to satisfy the inspection 
demands of aging offshore O&G installations located on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. 
2 Technical integrity 
The management and assurance of the technical integrity (TI) of offshore O&G 
production and process facilities is vital on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, as they are facing 
aging problems since many of the installations have either reached or are about to 
reach end of the designed lifetime. TI in this context is defined as an item’s fitness-for-
service and compliance with regulations for health, safety and environmental (HSE) protection 
whilst assuring the optimum return on investment. Figure 1 illustrates the place of TI [as well 
as design integrity (DI) and operating integrity (OI)] within the context of asset integrity. The 
asset integrity can be considered as a hub where the axle connects. For example, the axle 
holds the organisation, which runs smoothly when all three spokes (DI, TI and OI) are 
equally balanced round the hub within the traction surface. 
Figure 1 Design, technical and operating integrity 
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Technological advancement made it possible to extend the oil/gas reservoirs which were 
previously thought to be unprofitable. However, with the global economic crisis, 
substantial investments on available and new installations are not justified for extended 
production (life time). At the same time, aging, overloading, and various stresses degrade the 
systems and components (Valdez Flores and Feldman, 1989). Degradation particularly may take 
place in the form of corrosion, erosion or stress generation. Any of these factors or their 
combination can become a cause of failure. Therefore, O&G production and process facilities are 
under the constant threat of leaks and failures which might lead to catastrophic consequences. 
Figure 2 illustrates the failure rate vs. the age of an asset. 
Figure 2 Failure rate vs. age of an asset 
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Figure 3 Technical Integrity vs. time 
During the end of life, TI tends to decline at a fast rate. However, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, it is possible to improve the TI continuously by implementing pro-active 
solutions (Ratnayake et al., 2011). 
For instance, to avoid incidents, inspection, repair, and replacement activities are 
carried out according to the stringent HSE norms. In complex plants and process 
industries, there is a constant need to maintain a desired safety level or to improve upon the 
present safety level in order to safeguard lives, property, investments and the 
environment (Bjorge and Bratseth, 1996; Khan and Amyotte, 2002; Mearns and Flin, 1995; 
Rundmo et al., 1998; Vanderperre and Makhanov, 2002). The harsh marine 
environmental conditions result in adverse operational challenges, due to degradation in the 
form of corrosion, erosion or stress generation of a production and process facility’s 
infrastructure. Therefore, it is customary for installations to experience the constant threat of 
leaks and failures which might lead to catastrophic consequences. Wear, corrosion, erosion, 
fatigue and crack generation are major contributors to system/component degradation 
(Clifton, 1974). The challenge is to manage TI while optimising the cost without 
compromising on risk and safety issues. Therefore, a cost-effective approach for maintaining 
the TI through optimum maintenance and up-gradation of the existing production and 
process facilities’ infrastructure is an economically sound alternative in the current scenario. 
One of the major facets in TI management is to plan adequate inspections based on 
focused areas as specified by the plant strategy of the operator company, degradation 
mechanisms that can be anticipated and historical data about the equipment status. For 
example, in the case of petroleum flowline inspections, the wall thickness of the 
components will speak for the status. Petroleum flowlines are the topside piping systems on a 
production and process facility delivering well stream from the wellhead (from the Christmas 
tree) to the production manifold. Inspection in the operational phase is a maintenance 
activity carried out at predetermined time intervals in order to reduce the probability of 
failure (or the performance degradation) of the system/component (Bahrami-
Ghasrchami et al., 1998). The inspection cost increases when the inspection interval is 
shortened (or the inspection frequency is increased), as inspection is one of the cost elements 
(Jardine and Tsang, 2006). However, the probability of loss caused by failure will increase 
when the inspection interval is lengthened (Rajasankar et al., 2003). Therefore, an appropriate 
setting of inspection schedules is also important for optimising expenses. 
Generally, the petroleum pipelines are designed in such a way that safety provisions are 
created to provide a theoretical minimum failure rate for their lifetime and they are 
considered to be the most energy efficient, safe, environmentally friendly and economic way 
to deliver hydrocarbons (gas, crude oil, and finished products) (Dey et al., 2004). Various 
techniques are regularly used to monitor the status of pipelines. For instance, pipelines for 
hydrocarbons, kill-mud, blow-down, etc. are inspected with different priorities based on 
the impact to the main production stream. 
The flowlines on an O&G production and process facility are one of most critical 
piping components which demand a major share of inspection time to assure their 
reliability as they carry water, oil, gas and sand particles along with different 
combinations of other chemical compounds. Furthermore, they are mainly made of 
carbon steel (except in modern production facilities), in the field where this study has been 
carried out. Consequently, there is a higher vulnerability to suffer from the prevalence 
of ‘time-dependent’ type threats, including internal corrosion (pitting, impingement, 
erosion, corrosion, etc.), hydrogen blistering, hydrogen embrittlement, sulphide stress 
corrosion cracking and hydrogen assisted corrosion fatigue (Olorunniwo and Imasogie, 
2005). 
3 Factors influencing flowline degradation 
The degradation rate of a flowline can be affected by a number of factors as summarised in 
Figure 4 (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010c; Ayazi et al., 2006). Under the continuous 
influence of these factors, different types of degradation can be observed in a flowline. 
Khan and Howard (2007) have classified the flowline degradation into uniform and non-
uniform/localised degradation. A uniform corrosion is an example of the uniform 
degradation process. In uniform degradation, the life of different components is defined as 
the time taken for the wall thickness to reach the optimum acceptance criteria 
depending on the financial situation of the facility owner, HSE requirements, etc. On the 
contrary, pitting, crevice corrosion and stress corrosion cracking are the best known 
examples of non-uniform degradation. 
Figure 4 Flowline degradation factors 
≅ Temperature
≅ Flowline 
material≅ Flow 
velocity
≅ Flow 
regime
≅ pH value
≅ Environmental 
conditions
≅ Sand particle level
Corrosion
Erosion
Stress
≅ Oil/water wetting
≅ Water content
≅ Chloride level
≅ CO2 level
≅ Humidity
≅ H2S
≅ Weight
≅ Vibration
≅ Pressure
≅ Wall thickness
≅ Layout & support 
arrangement
Adverse climatic conditions corrode the petroleum flowlines externally, whereas 
undesirable contents flowing in the flowlines corrode them internally. The potential for 
flowline failure, caused either directly or indirectly by corrosion, is perhaps the most 
familiar hazard associated with steel pipelines (Muhlbauer, 1996). Corrosion is an 
electrochemical process. It is a time-dependent mechanism and depends on the local 
environment within or adjacent to a pipeline (Cosham et al., 2007). The flowline material 
plays an important role in withstanding the degrading conditions, both internally and 
externally. Flowline degradation takes place mainly due to stress generation, corrosion or 
erosion. A higher sand particle level can accelerate the erosion rate of the internal surface of 
the flowline. Erosion is the accelerated mechanical removal of surface material as a result 
of relative movement between, or impact from solids, liquids, vapour or any 
combination thereof. Erosion-corrosion is a description of the damage that occurs when 
corrosion contributes to erosion by removing protective films or scales, or by exposing the 
metal surface to further corrosion under the combined action of erosion and corrosion (API 
RP 571, 2003).
4 Strategy for maintaining piping components’ TI: virtual failure state 
In order to assure TI (i.e., basically to prevent leakages), it is vital to maintain the wall 
thickness of piping components which has been designed based on the operating factors 
(i.e., T3). However, when it comes to steel piping, it is required to have corrosion (and/or 
erosion) allowance (CA) over the expected lifetime of a particular sub-system and/or a 
production and process facility. However, once the CA is added to the design thickness 
based on the operating factors, the corresponding piping component with the resultant 
thickness might not be available in the product catalogue. Moreover, it is customary to 
select the next highest thickness available in a product catalogue. The final thickness is 
designated as nominal thickness (Tn). For TI management purposes, companies use their 
own notations to represent different degradation levels of piping components in terms of 
wall thickness. For instance, (Tn – corrosion allowance) is designated as T1. 
Alternatively, the wall thickness of a piping component before starting its intended 
function is designated as nominal thickness level (Tn). 
T3 Minimum wall thickness of piping components as specified by ASME B31.3 (2006) 
Tn The wall thickness according to diameter and flowline-class [the next highest 
dimension from T3 + corrosion allowance] 
T1 = (Tn – CA) 
T2 = (T3 + CA) 
Figure 5 illustrates the different thickness designations. 
Figure 5 Thickness designations in relation to a piping component’s wall thickness 
T3 T2 T1 Tn
The nominal wall thickness starts to decrease over time as a result of degradation 
(corrosion, erosion, chemical attack, etc.). When it reaches the safety limit specified in 
relation to a universally accepted standard (e.g., ASME B31.3, 2006), it is referred to as 
‘virtual failure state’ (see Figure 6, Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010c). If a component’s wall 
thickness level has passed all the other levels and reached the virtual failure state [i.e., 
technical condition (TC) has reached 0%], it is considered to have failed and some 
maintenance and/or modification action in the form of replacement, repair, etc. needs to be 
taken. 
Figure 6 Degradation in flowline components in the form of wall thickness reduction 
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Also, the piping components undergo different failure rates (see Figure 6) where some 
components (or component groups) indicate failure rates higher than the others. This can 
happen due to special causes such as a sudden increase in the sand particle level, change in 
turbulence pattern, etc. These components can only be recognised by doing a random check 
of certain locations in a sub-system (e.g., petroleum flowline, closed drainage system, 
etc.), based on the amount of time elapsed without inspecting. They are observed through 
the historical data of an equipment group under inspection. Some components are 
replaced before they reach the virtual failure state, due to a campaign/bulk 
replacement policy being followed by various companies on their production and process 
assets. A justification for such an action may be based on the estimation that these 
components will enter the virtual failure state before the next block replacement is 
performed. A component may also be considered normally critical based on its location, 
thus leading to its early replacement. These places are mentioned in the plant strategy 
document of a particular production and process facility. 
The safety limit is derived to avoid serious and unacceptable damage due to failure in the 
form of leaks or cracks. Serious and unacceptable damage may result, for instance: the 
loss of human life, damage to the marine environment, production loss, loss of 
physical assets, etc. Therefore, periodic inspections are performed in order to assure that 
replacement and repair actions are carried out well in advance of the actual failure state 
being reached. However, to carry out inspections means to invest significant finance. For 
instance, when the inspection interval is increased (or frequency decreased) more piping 
components may come closer to the virtual failure state and consequently actual failure 
state. Hence, the companies estimate the TC of piping components based on the wall 
thickness reduction (see Figure 7). For instance, if there is zero degradation then the TC of 
the component is said to be 100%. The inspections are carried out based on the 
frequency specified by the plant strategy, until a component reaches T1. When the 
thickness level passes T1, the inspections are carried out more frequently and then the TC is 
said to be in the range of 40% to 70%. 
Figure 7 Wall thickness vs. TC 
The TC designations are utilised for inspection management purposes. For instance, 
when inspection planning is carried out focusing on upcoming preventive maintenance 
(PM) shutdown, it is required to assign the number of inspections for a certain 
subsystem. Hence, in order to place special attention on the different levels of 
degradations on piping components, TC categorisation is utilised. In general, the 
frequency of inspection is decided by inspection managers with the help of a plant 
inspection strategy and the TC of a subsystem on a specific production and process 
facility. The plant inspection strategy replicates inspection planners’ past experience 
about similar locations, data available, intuitions, intentions and the perception of HSE 
consequences. 
5 Framing the inspection planning process 
The inspection planning process is based on the continuous improvement initiatives 
(indicated in the plant inspection planning strategy), personnel, material and supporting 
documents. For each production and process facility, a manager is assigned (called the 
programme manager) to guide the inspection planner/s through the follow-up 
recommendations. The follow-up points are the locations where degradation is already 
recognised based on previous inspection/s results. Hence, based on findings’ reports, past 
data, experience in similar locations, etc., the programme manager provides 
recommendations for maintaining the TI of an installation. Then, based on 
recommendations received by the inspection programme manager, and incorporating his/
her own experience, data, intuitions and the intentions, the planner arranges an 
inspection programme. Once the inspection programme is ready, it is sent to the offshore 
production and process facility, then inspectors start to execute inspection activities and 
update the piping inspection database (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010c). The whole 
process can be framed as shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 A framework for carrying out inspection planning to maintain the TI of a production 
and process facility 
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The programme management is responsible for the installation, and the inspection 
planner utilises reports, data, etc. from different sources. This again is a kind of iterative 
process and illustrated in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 Inspection planning: an iterative process 
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The iterative process can be further cascaded down to activity level, as illustrated in Figure 
10 (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010c). It also illustrates interrelationships between different 
sources that are used to obtain the status of TC and how improvement suggestions 
(inputs or improvements) are used to improve the plant inspection strategy and as inputs to 
PM projects. 
The data and information are transferred through several data handling tools along with 
governance documents. Figures 11(a) and 11(b) illustrate the strategy execution and 
improvement, respectively, used in the inspection planning process. 
Through analysis, the evaluation of future consequences and trends of the TC of the 
installation is determined. This information is used as input to next year’s inspection 
programme, the development of follow-up points, suggestions for PM projects, etc. 
  
Figure 10 A map of inspection planning aids used to maintain the TI of a production and process facility  
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Figure 11 Roles, resources, conditions and tools used to control the TC of a production and 
process facility 
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Figure 11 Roles, resources, conditions and tools used to control the TC of a production and 
process facility (continued) 
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6 Challenges in executing company and plant strategy: an industrial case 
Flange inspection is mainly carried out by close visual inspections. The visual inspection is 
considered as the most reliable method of inspection as long as the inspector has access to the 
location. Visual inspections are comprised of two approaches: general visual inspections and 
close visual inspections. In this manuscript, the authors consider close visual inspection of 
flanges where the flange should physically be opened. In order to open the flange, the complete 
spool should be taken out when it is not a blind flange. This process consumes fairly considerable 
time and resources depending on the physical orientation of a spool and to what extent the 
surrounding area permits without a congestion. Hence, the limited period of PM shutdown, 
financial constraints, and time and resource availability restrict the number of close visual 
inspections. In addition to that, within a certain inspection programme, it is customary to have 
more openings than can be inspected. For instance, in a certain PM shutdown, the approximate 
number of openings goes up from ten to 15. Thus, a multi-criteria decision-making approach has to 
be utilised by the programme manager responsible for the production and process facility as well as 
by the inspection planner to prioritise them based on the conditions imposed by the plant inspection 
strategy and historical data analysis. The model should be able to eliminate already 
recommended openings to reach an acceptable level of openings while maintaining the TI of the 
production facility, as dictated in the plant strategy. 
TC reports are developed based on the discoveries made from past offshore 
inspection findings on piping components and/or degradation trends. The developed TC reports 
recommend the number of locations (or piping components) that should be inspected on 
petroleum flowlines in a certain year, using non-destructive evaluation methods such as: 
visual inspection, ultrasonic testing, radiographic testing, etc. In general, the TC report 
suggests ten to 15 visual inspections focusing on a PM shutdown. However, it is customary to 
suggest several close visual inspections in the final inspection programme that cannot be 
carried out during a PM shutdown because of resource limitations (e.g., number of man 
hours, equipment, shutdown period, etc.). 
The main reason is that for an average inspection planner, it is not possible to 
simultaneously take into consideration all the criteria specified in the plant inspection strategy 
such as: data received from findings’ reports, historical trends, and special focus points from 
piping inspection data, as well as various other recommendations. The optimisation of such 
points is currently done on an ad hoc basis. The final outcome of ad hoc or unstructured decisions 
does not guarantee that the TI of a production and process facility is assured. This is due to the fact 
that the least requirement; where, the criteria in plant inspection strategy is not executed as supposed 
to. 
7 Mathematical modelling: plant strategy execution and AHP approach 
AHP is a problem-solving framework and a systematic procedure for representing the elements 
of any problem (Saaty, 1983). The AHP framework provides a flexible and easily understood 
way of analysing complicated problems (Saaty, 1980). The framework itself provides a multiple 
criteria decision-making technique that allows subjective as well as objective factors to be 
considered in the decision-making process. The AHP is a theory of measurement for dealing with 
quantifiable and intangible criteria that have been applied to numerous areas, such as decision 
theory and conflict resolution (Vargas, 1990). The active participation of decision-makers in 
reaching agreement whilst giving managers a rational basis on which to make decisions is the 
main role of the AHP approach, which is based on the following three principles: decomposition, 
comparative judgment and synthesis of priorities. 
Dyer and Forman (1992) describe the advantages of AHP in a group setting as follows: 
1 both tangibles and intangibles, individual values and shared values can be included 
in an AHP-based group decision process 
2 the discussion in a group can be focused on objectives rather than alternatives 
3 the discussion can be structured so that every factor relevant to the discussion is 
considered in turn 
4 in a structured analysis, the discussion continues until all relevant information from 
each individual member in a group has been considered and a consensus choice of 
the decision alternative is achieved. 
A detailed discussion on conducting AHP-based group decision-making sessions 
(including suggestions for assembling the group, constructing the hierarchy, getting the group to 
agree, inequalities of power, concealed or distorted preferences and implementing the 
results) can be found in Saaty (1990) and Golden et al. (1989). For problems with using AHP in 
group decision-making, see Islei et al. (1991). 
Researchers use AHP in various industrial applications. Partovi et al. (1990) used it for 
operations management decision-making. Dey et al. (1994) used it in managing the risk of 
projects. Eyrich (1991), Korpela and Tuominen (1996) and Dey (2002) have also effectively used 
AHP for benchmarking various business functions. Mian and Christine (1999) used AHP for the 
evaluation and selection of a private sector project. Meredith and Mantel (2000) described AHP 
as an effective tool for project selection. Dey and Gupta (1999) used AHP for cross-country 
petroleum pipeline route selection. 
In this research study, a simultaneous analysis of conditions coming from plant strategy, 
criticality aspects of flowlines and historical data is modelled using AHP. The following are the 
rationale for using AHP for inspection planning: 
• The factors that lead to inspection planning are both objective and subjective.
• They are also conflicting in nature, where achievement of one factor may result in
sacrificing others.
• There is a need for a subjective approach to the selection of inspection points that
can incorporate objectivity.
• AHP provides a flexible and easily understood way to analyse each factor that is
coming under the inspection planning. It allows subjective as well as objective
factors to be considered.
• AHP calls for the active participation of decision-makers in reaching agreement and
gives managers a rational basis on which to make decisions.
8 An industrial case to illustrate the proposed mathematical modelling approach  
Basically, AHP can accommodate both objective and subjective judgments of the 
evaluators involved in order to make a trade-off and to determine priorities among them for 
making sharp decisions. The process has four main phases, involving: 
1 the structuring of a decision problem 
2 the conduct of data collection 
3 the computation of normalised weights 
4 the determination of a synthesis-finding solution to the problem (Saaty, 1990). 
8.1 Structuring the decision problem 
The model for executing the plant strategy (this can also be referred to as inspection planning 
strategy) is established using the AHP approach by conducting a few brainstorming 
sessions and studying the company inspection planning strategy. In this case study, we have 
selected one critical case related to optimisation of close visual inspections. Hence, it is 
indicated at level 0 in Figure 12. 
In a plant inspection strategy, the focused areas are specified based on the criticality of the 
location of the flowline. For instance, hook-up spool, material specification changes (e.g., 
carbon steel to duplex stainless steel), the spool just after the chick-valve, etc., are highly 
vulnerable to degradation. However, if a certain flange is not inspected for a considerable time 
(within the period of time specified by the regulatory authorities, standards, etc.), then, there is 
high likelihood of a leak in the near future. Hence, the ‘criticality of the flowline’, ‘focused 
areas specified by the plant strategy’ and ‘historical data’ are at the same level of the developed 
AHP hierarchical model (see Figure 12).
 Figure 12 Optimisation objective and incorporating a company plant inspection strategy 
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Figure 13 Incorporation of a company plant inspection strategy: criticality, focused areas and 
historical data analysis 
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Then, each of them is further cascaded down into level 2, based on the company plant 
inspection strategy (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010c). For instance, criticality of the 
flowline is taken into consideration with respect to HSE related damage, damage to 
physical assets, and production loss. It is recommended that the possible incidents are 
maintained at as low as reasonably possible (ALARP) (Ratnayake and Liyanage, 2009). On 
the other hand, the ERM concerns and results can be integrated at this node (see Figure 
13). Moreover, the focused areas specified by the plant strategy typically address the concerns 
that are available in a company plant strategy and they should be at level 2. Also, the 
observations made with the help of ‘historical data’ analysis should be at level 2 (see 
Figure 13). 
At level 3, the total number of visual inspection recommendations should be included (i.e., 
the number of locations to be optimised) and should be independently evaluated with 
respect to each fact at level 2 (see Figure 14). They represent plant inspection strategy as 
well as historical data analysis. 
Figure 14 A model to optimise the recommended inspection points based on company plant 
inspection strategy: criticality, focused areas and historical data analysis 
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Figure 14 maps the contents defined by the company plant inspection strategy and human 
judgment and historical data analysis into a single decision model. This model helps to 
replace current ad hoc decision making approach/es while providing a structured 
mechanism to execute company plant inspection strategy along with quantitative results. 
8.2 Conducting data collection: design of a questionnaire 
Phase 2 involves the collection of data and the determination of the relative importance of 
criteria and sub-criteria in the AHP model. Various researchers reported differing 
numbers of experts/evaluators helping to assess the AHP model in relation to their 
application. In the case of Chiang and Lai (2002), this was 12 experts/evaluators; for 
Qureshi and Harrison (2003) the number was 13; Pun and Hui (2001) reported six 
experts/evaluators, Law et al. (2006) eight and Sinuany-Stern et al. (2006) reported four 
experts/evaluators. Therefore, the number of experts or evaluators necessary to execute 
the company plant inspection strategy should be decided based on the significance of the 
application. 
Table 2 depicts a nine-point scale that is used to assign the relative scales and priority 
weights of the decision criteria and sub-criteria. Individual evaluators are asked to 
evaluate carefully the criteria of each hierarchy level by assigning relative scales in a 
pairwise fashion. 
Table 2 Nine-point rating scale to implement model 
Intensity of 
importance1 Definition Explanations
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute  
equally to the objective 
3 Weak importance of one over other Experience and judgment slightly  
favour one activity over another 
5 Essential or strong importance Experience and judgment favour 
one activity over another 
7 Demonstrated importance An activity is strongly favoured and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Absolute importance The evidence favouring one activity  
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values between  
the two adjacent judgments 
When compromise is needed 
Note: 1If activity i has one of the above non-zero numbers assigned to it when compared 
with activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared with i. 
Source: Saaty (1980, 1990) 
Sample questions for acquiring information from the experts or evaluators during the 
interviewing exercises are proposed in Table 3 (Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010b). 
The questions’ building process should be continued until all comparison judgment 
matrices corresponding to the decision criteria and alternatives used are obtained, as 
illustrated in Table 3. Experience has confirmed that the scaling mechanism reflects the 
degree to which one could distinguish the intensity of relationships among decision 
criteria and elements (Saaty 1980, 1990). 
Table 3 Proposed sample questions for implementing AHP model 
Please compare the decision criteria and circle your answer using the scale below: 
1 = equal; 3 = moderate; 5 = strong; 7 = very strong; 9 = extreme (see Table 2) 
Increasing importance Increasing importance 
← → 
A What is the relative importance of the ‘criticality of the flowline’ and other decision criteria 
in the right column in the table below when you compare with ‘optimising number of 
openings for close visual inspection’? 
Criticality of  
the flowline 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Focused areas 
specified by 
plant strategy 
Criticality of  
the flowline 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Historical data 
B What is the relative importance of the ‘focused areas specified by plant strategy’ and other 
decision criteria in the right column in the table below when you compare with ‘optimising 
number of openings for close visual inspection’? 
Focused areas 
specified by 
plant strategy 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Criticality of  
the flow line 
Focused areas 
specified by 
plant strategy 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Historical data 
8.3 Computation of normalised weights 
Phase 3 focuses on the determination of the normalised weights of decision criteria, sub-
criteria and alternatives. The pairwise comparison judgment matrices obtained in Phase 2 
translate into an Eigen-value problem. With the aid of a software tool, the normalised 
and unique priority vectors of weights can be calculated for the individual decision 
criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives (see Ratnayake and Markeset, 2010a, 2010b). The 
geometric mean approach is recommended to combine the pairwise comparison 
judgment matrices obtained from individual evaluators (Saaty, 1980). 
8.4 Determination of a synthesis-finding solution to the problem 
In Phase 4, the global priority weights in each hierarchy level are calculated by 
multiplying the normalised priority weights in the preceding levels. The summation of the 
global priority weight in each level is equal to one. The results of the global 
composite weights (i.e., the global priority weights at the lowest alternative level) help to 
determine the relative priority for inspecting locations in relation to focused areas/factors. 
Furthermore, in the framework, all the factors at each level would be comprised of 
relevant weights which would be a reflection of the extent to which the strategy related 
factors as well as quantitative analysis have been used to arrive at a final conclusion 
about optimisation of openings for carrying out close visual inspections. In this process, not 
only strategy related factors are taken into account, but the relative contribution of each 
factor to the final outcome can be assessed. These results alternatively send feedback 
signals to the management to improve lagging areas of concern. 
The former mapping is done through common consensus among the expert(s) – those who 
have had experience in inspection planning and relevant documentation. However, if 
disagreements occur in this kind of modelling process, they are resolved by reasoning and by 
collecting more information. The model is built to include a company plant inspection strategy 
along with qualitative results based on a production and process facility which, in turn, would 
support the selection of the optimum number of points for carrying out close visual 
inspections. This gives opportunity to the approving authority to understand the whole process 
and the basis of selection. 
In this process of modelling, the factors imposed in a company plant inspection 
strategy as well as experiences, data, intuitions and intentions of managers responsible for 
inspection programmes and inspection planners are formally merged into a single 
mathematical model using pairwise comparison matrices (see Saaty, 1980) described in the 
AHP approach. Then, using software or manual calculations, the pairwise comparison matrices 
are analysed as suggested in the AHP approach. At the end of the analysis, each inspection 
point would receive a number. Based on the numbers, corresponding points can be arranged 
in descending order of magnitude. Using the descending sequence, the points (i.e., those 
having the highest priority number) are recognised. Care must be taken to include no more 
than nine items under each node of the hierarchy (see also Haj Shirmohammadi and 
Wedley, 2004). Hence, when there are more than nine points to be optimised (n > 9), the 
analysis can be carried out several times. The points with the highest priority number 
from each group can finally be included into the inspection programme depending on 
the total number of openings allowed in the inspection programme for a PM 
shutdown. Ratnayake and Markeset (2010a) illustrate the application of a suggested 
kind of model in a different scenario (i.e., measuring organisational alignment in a 
manufacturing organisation). 
9 Conclusions 
The hierarchical decision model generated by the AHP method represents an interesting and 
alternative analysis tool which is useful to execute the conditions specified by a company 
plant inspection strategy, trends revealed by historical data analysis as well as the criticality 
of the flowline in relation to HSE, financial and damage to the physical assets. In this 
process of analysis, the risk perception can also be taken into account when making pairwise 
comparisons. This addresses ERM incorporation within the strategy execution process. 
Apart from that, an excellent compromise between the hierarchical model readability and 
its visualisation capacity has been obtained with the help of the AHP approach. The 
outcome of the analysis makes it possible to recognise the most important locations in a 
hierarchy among the recommendations to carry out close visual inspections in relation to the 
projected TC of the production and process facility. Hence, by proper execution of a 
company plant inspection strategy, the assets (e.g., flowlines, processed gas supply lines, 
closed drainages, fire-water systems, etc.) can be subjected to appropriate monitoring or 
protection action maintaining the risk of an incident at ALARP. Consequently, this 
improves the TI by reducing the risk of leakages. 
For adaptation of the strategy execution model proposed in this manuscript to suit the 
specific requirements of a production and process facility, a detailed knowledge about the 
company plant inspection strategy is required. In particular, the right knowledge about 
tools that are used for inspection planning, focused areas specified by plant strategy, etc., 
reinforces the ability of implementing the suggested strategy execution model. Also, an 
understanding of the physical configuration of the asset (e.g., flowline) and critical parameters 
is essential. Such information can be obtained from detailed drawings such as PM-drawings, 
P&ID, etc., as well as from the offshore inspectors (i.e., those who carry out physical 
inspections on offshore production and process facilities based on the recommendations made 
by inspection planners) and the design office staff. 
It is also vital to have an overview of the production and process facility. Hence, an 
inspection tour of the production and process facility and having discussions with the 
personnel responsible for operations are recommended. Information obtained from these 
sources will be beneficial to get the real essence of strategy related factors for making 
pairwise comparisons. When making pairwise comparisons, the range of values or 
numerical values of the physical parameters which are appropriate to the assets (e.g., 
petroleum flowlines) or process, a consideration of the legal requirements, moral 
obligation and financial requirements should be borne in mind. The beauty of the 
approach is that strategy related factors as well as analysed data, experiences, intentions and 
intuitions are incorporated in a logical and methodical way in a single mathematical model to 
explore an optimum result. Further research should be carried out to investigate how analytic 
network process (ANP) can be used if/when there are dependencies among factors at each 
level. 
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